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Abstract
We present a revealed preference analysis of the testable implications of the Nash
bargaining solution. Our specic focus is on a two-player game involving consump-
tion decisions. We consider a setting in which the empirical analyst has information
on both the threat points bundles and the bargaining outcomes. We rst establish
a revealed preference characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. This char-
acterization implies conditions that are both necessary and sucient for consistency
of observed consumption behavior with the Nash bargaining model. However, these
conditions turn out to be nonlinear in unknowns and therefore dicult to verify.
Given this, we subsequently present necessary conditions and sucient conditions
that are linear (and thus easily testable). We illustrate the practical usefulness of
these conditions by means of an application to experimental data. Such an exper-
imental setting implies a most powerful analysis of the empirical goodness of the
Nash bargaining model for describing consumption decisions. To our knowledge,
this provides a rst empirical test of the Nash bargaining model on consumption
data. Finally, we consider the possibility that threat point bundles are not observed.
This obtains testable conditions for the Nash bargaining model that can be used in
non-experimental (e.g. household consumption) settings, which often do not contain
information on individual consumption bundles in threat points.
JEL Classication: D11, D12, D13
Keywords: consumption decision, Nash bargaining, revealed preferences, experi-
mental data
CentER, Tilburg University and Center for Economic Studies, University of Leuven. E. Sabbelaan 53,
B-8500 Kortrijk, Belgium. email: L.Cherchye@uvt.nl. Laurens Cherchye gratefully acknowledges nancial
support from the Research Fund K.U.Leuven through the grant STRT1/08/004.
yCenter for Economic Studies, University of Leuven. E. Sabbelaan 53, B-8500 Kortrijk, Belgium.
email: thomas.demuynck@kuleuven-kortrijk.be. Thomas Demuynck gratefully acknowledges the Fund for
Scientic Research- Flanders (FWO-Vlaanderen) for his postdoctoral fellowship.
zECARES-ECORE, Universit e Libre de Bruxelles. Avenue F.D. Roosevelt 50, CP 114, B-1050 Brussels,
Belgium. email: bderock@ulb.ac.be. Bram De Rock gratefully acknowledges the European Research
Council (ERC) for his Starting Grant.
11 Introduction
Bargaining models describe decision processes that simultaneously involve multiple play-
ers. They dene the outcome of such a process by using information on a bargaining set,
which includes all attainable utility levels for every player, and a set of threat (or disagree-
ment) points. In the literature, the Nash bargaining model is by far the most popular
one.1 For example, it has been used for describing household decision making, rm-union
wage negotiations, job-matching and job-search models, international trade and oligopolis-
tic competition. The Nash bargaining solution is then mainly used for its theoretical
convenience: studies usually assume the model without empirical motivation. Somewhat
surprisingly given its widespread use, relatively few studies have actually focused on the
testable implications of the Nash bargaining solution.
In this paper, we concentrate on the testable implications of the Nash bargaining model
for a two-player game involving consumption decisions on bundles of goods. The distin-
guishing feature of our study is that we build on the revealed preference characterization
of the model. As we will discuss below, this revealed preference approach has some partic-
ularly attractive features for empirically testing a specic behavioral model. We demon-
strate the practical usefulness of the approach by an application to experimental data.
We conduct a specially tailored experiment that implies a most powerful analysis of the
Nash bargaining model as a tool for describing decisions on consumption bundles. To our
knowledge, this provides a rst empirical test of this model in a consumption setting. Next,
we also discuss the applicability of our revealed preference approach to observational (or
non-experimental) data, which can be useful for household consumption analysis on the
basis of the Nash bargaining model.
Testable implications of the Nash bargaining solution. Starting with Manser and
Brown (1980)'s seminal contribution, a few studies have focused on the testable implica-
tions of the Nash bargaining solution for consumption decisions.2 A common feature of
these studies is that they follow a dierential approach, which concentrates on properties of
functions representing the primitives of the decision process (e.g. individual preferences).3
Empirical applications of this approach then usually require some (non-veriable) a priori
specication of these functions. And, thus, testing consistency of observed behavior with
the Nash bargaining model is always conditional upon this specication. This will imply
a basic dierence with our further analysis, which follows a revealed preference approach
rather than a dierential one.
1Other frequently used models are the generalized Nash bargaining model Harsanyi and Selten (1972),
the Raia-Kalai-Smorodinsky model (Raia (1953), Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975)), the egalitarian model
(Kalai (1977), Roth (1979)) and the equal sacrice model (O'Neill (1982), Aumann and Maschler (1985)).
In this respect, see also our discussion in the concluding section.
2See, for example, Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981), Ulph (1988), McElroy and
Horney (1990), McElroy (1990), Lundberg and Pollak (1993), Konrad and Lommerud (2000) and Chen
and Woolley (2001).
3The term `dierential' then refers to the fact that this approach focuses on properties obtained by
integrating and/or dierentiating these functions.
2Another notable dierence pertains to the fact that existing studies typically do not
present a characterization of the Nash bargaining model. Rather, they focus on explain-
ing deviations between behavior consistent with the Nash-bargaining model and behavior
consistent with maximizing a single utility function (which follows the so-called `unitary'
consumption model, with the well-known Slutsky conditions as a dierential character-
ization). In this respect, one notable exception is the study of Chiappori, Donni, and
Komunjer (2011) . These authors do provide a characterization of the Nash bargaining so-
lution. But, again, their analysis diers from ours in that it follows a dierential approach.
In addition, Chiappori, Donni, and Komunjer focus on a slightly dierent setting than we
do: contrary to most of the above mentioned studies, they consider testable implications of
the Nash bargaining solution for the problem of sharing a pie (e.g. budget sharing) rather
than for consumption decisions involving bundles of goods.
When it comes to testable implications of the Nash bargaining solution, threat points
always play a crucial role.4 These threat points are the outcomes of individual players in
the case no agreement is reached, and are also referred to as disagreement points. In this
study, we carry out a specic experiment that naturally allows for obtaining information
on threat point consumption bundles. As we will indicate in Section 4, this entails a very
powerful analysis of the empirical goodness of the Nash bargaining model. Importantly,
in Section 5 we also discuss the possible extension of our basic framework to situations
in which the threat point bundles are not observed. This will obtain testable conditions
for the Nash bargaining model that can be used in non-experimental (e.g. household
consumption) settings, which often do not contain information on individual consumption
bundles in threat points.5
Revealed preferences. We adopt a revealed preference approach in the tradition of
Samuelson (1938), Houthakker (1950), Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) and Varian (1982).
In contrast to the dierential approach, this approach does not require any functional
specication prior to the analysis. By contrast, it obtains testable conditions that can be
veried by (only) using a nite set of consumption observations (i.e. prices and quantities).
This avoids that a particular behavioral model (such as the Nash bargaining model) is
rejected because of an erroneous specication (while the actual consumption behavior is
consistent with the model).
Another advantage of the revealed preference approach is that it can be meaningfully
4See Chiappori (1988), McElroy and Horney (1990), McElroy (1990), Chiappori (1990) and Xu (2007)
for a thorough discussion of this point. In the sequel, we will follow the most common practice to consider
threat points as the outcome of individual players when they can spend some individually assigned budget
(under disagreement). Some authors adopt a slightly dierent viewpoint and assume that players reach a
noncooperative Nash equilibrium in the disagreement case . See, for example, Ulph (1988), Lundberg and
Pollak (1993), Konrad and Lommerud (2000) and Chen and Woolley (2001).
5In some real life settings, information on the position of threat points (and corresponding testable
implications) can be retrieved from environmental variables (e.g. prices, incomes and the so called extra-
environmental parameters (EEP) as termed by McElroy and Horney (1981) or distribution factors in the
terminology of Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori, and Lechene (1994)). But we do not follow this route
here.
3applied to small data sets. For our setting, this means that we can fruitfully use our
revealed preference conditions for testing the Nash bargaining model even with only a few
consumption observations. As such, we avoid (often debatable) preference homogeneity
assumptions across individual players. Specically, in Section 4 we will show that our
revealed preference tests have satisfactory discriminatory power for (only) 9 consumption
observations per dyad (i.e. two-player group).
Our study also complements a recent strand of literature that focuses on revealed
preference analysis of decision processes with multiple players. More specically, Cherchye,
De Rock, and Vermeulen (2007, 2011a) derived a revealed preference characterization of
the collective model, which assumes a Pareto optimal solution, and Cherchye, Demuynck,
and De Rock (2011b) provided a revealed preference characterization of noncooperative
behavior, which assumes a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. In fact, an important focus in
our following analysis will be on comparing the testable implications of the Nash bargaining
model with the ones of the collective model. Indeed, we believe that the collective model
provides a natural comparison partner for the Nash bargaining model, because it imposes
less prior structure.6 Our analysis shows that this structural dierence eectively translates
into dierent empirical restrictions.
One preliminary remark is in order with respect to our following revealed preference
analysis. Our specic focus will be on the characterization of the Nash bargaining model,
and testing consistency of observed behavior with the model. If observed behavior is
consistent with a particular model, then a natural next question pertains to recover-
ing/identifying the primitives of the underlying decision model (e.g. individual prefer-
ences). For compactness, we will not consider such recovery here. However, it is worth
emphasizing that our revealed preference characterization does allow for subsequent re-
covery analysis. For example, Varian (1982) and, more recently, Blundell, Browning, and
Crawford (2008) and Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2011a) studied such recovery
(based on revealed preferences) for closely related consumption models. The analysis of
these authors can be extended to the current setting when starting from the revealed
preference characterization established below.
Paper outline. Let us summarize our main points developed further on. Section 2
sets the stage by introducing the revealed preference approach on which we focus here.
Specically, it briey recaptures the revealed preference characterizations of individual
rationality (i.e. individual utility maximization) and collective rationality (i.e. rational
dyad behavior in terms of the collective model). This will be instrumental for our discussion
in the following sections.
Section 3 then derives the revealed preference characterization of the Nash bargaining
model for the case with observed threat point bundles. As we will show, verifying consis-
tency of observed consumption behavior with this characterization requires solving a set
6Specically, the collective model only assumes Pareto eciency, whereas the Nash bargaining model
additionally assumes symmetry, invariance with respect to ane transformations of the utility functions,
and contraction independence. See also our discussion in Section 3.
4of inequalities that are nonlinear in unknowns. Such nonlinear conditions are dicult to
use in empirical applications. Therefore, we establish (separate) necessary and sucient
conditions that are linear in the unknowns, which are easily testable.
In Section 4, we demonstrate the practical usefulness of our theoretical results by means
of an application to experimental data. It has been argued before that revealed preference
testing tools are especially useful within an experimental context; see, for example, Sippel
(1997), Harbaugh, Krause, and Berry (2001), Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Bruyneel,
Cherchye, and De Rock (2010).7 Moreover, the controlled environment of the lab allows us
to obtain data on threat point consumption bundles as well as on the bargaining outcomes.
As such, this provides an ideal setting to verify consistency of dyad consumption behavior
with the Nash equilibrium solution.
As far as we know, this experimental analysis is the rst one that actually tests the
validity of the Nash bargaining solution for decisions on consumption bundles. Existing
tests in the experimental literature typically do not consider consumption decisions. In ad-
dition, they often imply a double hypothesis that imposes a particular preference structure
in addition to the Nash bargaining solution.8 By its very nature, our revealed preference
analysis does not require such additional preference assumptions.
In Section 5, we focus on situations in which threat point bundles are not observed. Our
main argument here will be that the Nash bargaining solution may have stronger testable
implications than the collective consumption model even in such situations. Specically,
we show that this is the case as soon as either threat points are assumed to be the same in
dierent decision situations or if individual incomes (rather than individual consumption
bundles) at the disagreement points are known. As also indicated above, these ndings
may be relevant for applications to observational (e.g. household) data.
In Section 6 we conclude and suggest some avenues for further research. The Appendix
contains our proofs.
2 Revealed preference characterization of individual
and collective rationality
This section introduces notation and some basic concepts and results that will be useful for
our following discussion. We rst dene individual rationality and present the correspond-
ing revealed preference characterization and, subsequently, we do the same for collective
rationality.
7See also Cox (1997) for an extensive discussion on the use of revealed preference methodology in
combination with experimental data. In particular, this author indicates the implicit assumption that
decisions in the experiment are separable from other decisions of the same decision makers. Given our
experimental design (see Section 4), we believe that we can reasonably assume that this condition of
separability is met (at least by approximation).
8For example, two most frequently cited tests of the Nash bargaining model are reported by Siegel and
Fouraker (1960) and Roth and Malouf (1979). Siegel and Fouraker work with linear utility functions and
the results of Roth and Malouf rely on the assumption that individuals are expected utility maximizers.
52.1 Individual rationality
Throughout, we will consider consumption decisions on bundles with jNj goods. Our
analysis starts from a nite set of jTj decision situations, with T = f1; :::; jTjg. Each
situation t 2 T is characterized by prices pt 2 R
jNj
++ and income Yt. In the sequel, we will
assume utility functions that are continuous, concave, non-satiated and non-decreasing in
their arguments. As for now, suppose the individual is endowed with a utility function U.
This individual is rational if, for each t, (s)he selects a bundle qt 2 R
jNj
+ that solves the
following problem (OP-IR:)
qt 2 argmax
q U(q) s.t. ptq  Yt:
Consider a data set S = fpt;qtgt2T. We obtain the following condition for individual
rationality.
Denition 1. Let S = fpt;qtgt2T. We say that S is individually rationalizable if there
exists a utility function U such that, for all t 2 T, we have that qt solves OP-IR given
the utility function U, prices pt and income Yt = ptqt.
Varian (1982), based on Afriat (1967), provided the revealed preference characterization
of individual rationality. It is contained in the next theorem.
Theorem 1. Consider a data set S = fpt;qtgt2T. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) S is individually rationalizable.
(ii) For all t 2 T, there exist numbers Ut 2 R+ and t 2 R++ such that, for all t; v 2 T,
Ut   Uv  vpv(qt   qv):
In this result, the equivalence between statements (i) and (ii) means that there exists
a rationalizing utility function U if and only if the set S satises a number of inequalities
dened in the unknowns Ut and t. These inequalities are commonly referred to as Afriat
inequalities. Intuitively, these Afriat inequalities allow for an explicit construction of the
utility levels (Ut) and the marginal utilities of income (t) associated with each observation
t. We remark that these inequalities are linear in unknowns. Thus, we can use standard
linear programming techniques to verify if S is individually rationalizable.
2.2 Collective rationality
Consider a dyad (or two-player group) consisting of A and B, with utility functions UA
and UB. Like before, in each decision situation t the dyad spends an income Yt on a set of
6jNj goods. We will assume that all goods are privately consumed and that each individual
only cares for her/his own consumption.9
Collective rationality means consistency with the collective consumption model, which
assumes a Pareto optimal solution of the multi-player (in casu two-player) game. Based on
the second welfare theorem, Chiappori (1988, 1992) has shown that a collectively rational
consumption decision can be represented as if it were the outcome of a two-step procedure.
At each observation t, the rst step divides the income Yt into individual incomes Y A
t and
Y B
t (with Yt = Y A
t +Y B



















B(q) s.t. ptq  Y
B
t :
Now consider a data set S = fpt;qA
t ;qB
t gt2T. We get the following condition for
collective rationality.
Denition 2. Let S = fpt;qA
t ;qB
t gt2T. We say that S is collectively rationalizable if there
exist utility functions UA and UB such that, for all t 2 T, we have that qA
t and qB
t solve






Using the result in Theorem 1, this denition directly obtains a characterization of
collective rationality, which is given by the next theorem.
Theorem 2. Consider a data set S = fpt;qA
t ;qB
t gt2T. The following conditions are
equivalent:
(i) S is collectively rationalizable.
(ii) For all t 2 T, there exist numbers UA
t ;UB
t 2 R+ and A
t ;B
t 2 R++ such that, for all























9For simplicity, we will abstract from modeling public goods or consumption externalities and we will
focus on two-player groups. However, our following analysis can readily be extended to groups with more
than two players. It is also fairly easy to extend the theoretical models and the corresponding revealed
preference characterizations presented in this and the following sections to account for public goods and
externalities. For example, see Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2011a) for dealing with public goods
and externalities in revealed preference analysis of the collective consumption model.
7Just like for individual rationality, collective rationality requires nding a solution for
Afriat inequalities, which are linear in unknowns. In this case, we obtain a set of inequali-
ties for both A and B. As before, these inequalities allow for an explicit construction of (in
casu player-specic) utilities (UA
t and UB
t ) and marginal utilities of income (A
t and B
t ).
It will be interesting to compare this characterization with the revealed preference char-
acterization that applies to the Nash bargaining model. As indicated in the Introduction,
the Nash bargaining model diers from the collective model by assuming more than just
Pareto eciency for the within-dyad decision process.
3 Nash bargaining model
This section rst denes the Nash bargaining solution and introduces the corresponding
revealed preference characterization. As we will discuss below, this characterization is non-
linear in unknown variables, which makes it dicult to use in practical applications. Given
this, we subsequently present necessary conditions and sucient conditions for consistency
with the Nash bargaining model that are linear in unknowns. These conditions will be
used in our following application for empirical verication of the Nash bargaining model.
3.1 Revealed preference characterization
We again consider a setting with two players (A and B) who, in each situation t, spend the
income Yt on a set of jNj private goods. Like before, each individual only cares for her/his
own consumption. However, as is standard in the literature, we assume that the individuals'
preferences are (possibly) dierent under agreement and disagreement. Specically, A and
B have utility functions V A and V B if no agreement can be reached, while they have
utilities UA and UB in case of agreement (which means that the Nash bargaining solution
is implemented).
Let us rst consider the within-dyad allocation when no agreement is reached. In this
case, total income Yt is replaced by two individual incomes Y A
t and Y B
t . Importantly,
the sum of individual incomes at the disagreement point should not necessarily equal the
available income under agreement (i.e. we may have Y A
t + Y B
t < Yt). This reects the
possibility that disagreement can be costly, which actually implies an additional incentive
for eectively obtaining an agreement. Under disagreement, the individual players A and

















B(x) s.t. ptx  Y
B
t :
Next, if the players come to an agreement, then the dyad allocation coincides with the
Nash bargaining solution. For the given income Yt and prices pt, this solution maximizes
the product of the individuals' excess utility (i.e. utility under agreement minus utility
8under disagreement). As shown by Nash (1950), this is the unique bargaining outcome
that satises the axioms of Pareto optimality, symmetry, invariance with respect to ane
transformations of the utility functions, and contraction independence. We remark that
these four axioms usually lead to a unique outcome of the decision process. This implies
an important dierence with the collective consumption model. As indicated above, this
last model only assumes Pareto eciency, which generally characterizes a continuum of
possible outcomes.










































To obtain our testable implications of the Nash bargaining solution, let us assume




t gt2T. We note that this set S includes
consumption information on both the bargaining outcomes and the threat points. We will
get back to this below. Using the set S, we can dene the following Nash bargaining
rationality condition.




t gt2T. We say that S is Nash bargaining ratio-




t solve OP-TP for the utility functions V A and V B, prices pt and incomes
Y A
t = ptxA





t solve OP-NB for the utility functions UA and UB, prices pt, income
Yt = pt(qA
t + qB
t ) and threat points V A(xA
t ) and V B(xB
t ).
As shown in the Appendix, we get the next revealed preference characterization of Nash
bargaining rationalizability.




t gt2T. The following conditions
are equivalent:
(i) S is Nash bargaining rationalizable.
(ii) For all t 2 T, there exist numbers UA
t , UB
t , V A
t ;V B

































































t   V A
t
UB
t   V B
t
: (NB-vi)
Similar to Theorems 1 and 2, the inequalities (NB-i)-(NB-iv) are Afriat inequalities.
Like before, these inequalities allow us to construct (player-specic) utilities and marginal
utilities of income (in casu for both the bargaining outcomes and the threat points). More-
over, it follows from Theorem 2 that the inequalities (NB-i)-(NB-ii) guarantee that the
bargaining outcome is Pareto ecient. Next, the constraints (NB-v) correspond to the last
two constraints of OP-NB.
Finally, constraint (NB-vi) essentially captures the requirement that each bargaining
outcome must maximize the product of the individuals' excess utility; see the objective
function of OP-NB. This constraint (NB-vi) is the crucial one for obtaining testable
implications that are particular to the Nash bargaining solution. More specically, as
indicated above, the constraints (NB-i)-(NB-v) imply the existence of utility functions
V A; V B, UA and UB as well as Pareto eciency. Thus, constraint (NB-vi) guarantees
consistency with the remaining axioms underlying the Nash bargaining solution.
Unfortunately, the constraint (NB-vi) is nonlinear in the unknowns (UA
t , UB





t ). This makes it dicult to verify this constraint in practical applications. In
the next subsection, we will introduce necessary conditions and sucient conditions for
consistency with the characterization in Theorem 3. These conditions will be linear in
unknowns and, thus, do allow for empirical verication.





t gt2T. Firstly, this implicitly assumes that individuals always reach an
agreement, since we observe the corresponding bargaining outcomes. We could relax this
constraint by introducing additional notation. However, this would only complicate our
exposition without really adding new insights. Secondly, for each decision situation t we
need to observe not only the consumption bundles in the bargaining outcomes (qA
t and qB
t )
but also the threat point bundles (xA
t and xB
t ). Obviously, this may seem to be a stringent
data requirement. Still, as we will show in Section 4, such threat point information can
fairly easily be obtained in an experimental setting. Next, in Section 5 we will provide
testable implications of the Nash bargaining solution that imply weaker data requirements
and, therefore, can be useful in (non-experimental) settings where exact information about
the threat point bundles is lacking.
103.2 Empirical verication
The characterization in Theorem 3 implies conditions that are both necessary and su-
cient for consistency of observed consumption behavior with the Nash bargaining model.
However, because the constraint (NB-vi) turns out to be nonlinear in unknowns, these
conditions are dicult to apply. In what follows, we will present necessary conditions
and sucient conditions for Nash bargaining rationality that are linear and, thus, easily
testable. As we will indicate, these necessary and sucient conditions do not coincide,
which means that a particular data set may pass the necessary conditions but not the
sucient conditions. However, in Section 4 we will show that the conditions do obtain a
conclusive answer for most data sets in our application. In our opinion, this suggests that
these conditions constitute a useful starting point for empirically assessing Nash bargaining
rationality. In general, we may expect their empirical implications to be fairly close to each
other.
To obtain the conditions, we start from an equivalent reformulation of the constraint










t   V A
t
UB
t   V B
t
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t ) = 0 and t
A
t   (1   t)
B
t = 0 (NB-vi-a)
Sucient conditions. Evidently, the constraints (NB-vi-a) remain nonlinear in the
unknowns (UA
t , UB
t , V A
t ; V B
t ; A
t , B
t and t). However, they do suggest a natural sucient
condition for Nash bargaining rationality. Essentially, this sucient condition implies a
grid search on a nite set A that contains a series of possible values for the variable t in
the above constraints. Specically, consider a nite set A = fa1;a2;:::;aKg containing K
numbers from the unit interval ]0;1[. Then, we get the next result.




t gt2T and A = fa1;:::;aKg 2 ]0;1[K. The



















t ) = 0; (NB-vi-b)
t
A
t   (1   t)
B
t = 0: (NB-vi-c)
Thus, for a given set A, this result provides sucient conditions for Nash bargaining ra-
tionality, which replace the nonlinear constraint (NB-vi) in Theorem 3 by the constraints
(NB-vi-b)-(NB-vi-c). Clearly, for a given specication of f1;:::;jTjg the constraints
11(NB-vi-b)-(NB-vi-c) are linear in the unknowns (UA
t , UB
t , V A




practical implementation of these sucient conditions requires checking these linear con-
straints (together with (NB-i)-(NB-v)) for each possible specication of f1;:::;jTjg. In
our empirical application in Section 4 we use K = 9 and A = f0:1;0:2;:::;0:9g.
Necessary conditions. Our necessary conditions again start from a nite set A as
dened above. Still, unlike the sucient conditions in Proposition 1, which focus on
specic values t 2 A for each t, the necessary conditions consider all ak 2 A. At the
outset, it is worth indicating that these necessary conditions will be rather technical ones,
which have a less obvious intuition in terms of Nash bargaining rationality than our starting
characterization in Theorem 3. However, our empirical application in Section 4 will show
that they do have substantial practical usefulness. Actually, as also mentioned before, a
main result will be that the empirical implications of these necessary conditions are situated
fairly closely to those of the sucient conditions in Proposition 1.
The starting point of our necessary conditions is that, given (NB-vi-a), for each ak 2 A
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Clearly, the equality constraints in these expressions are nonlinear in the unknowns (UA
t ,
UB
t , V A
t ; V B
t ; A
t and B
t ):Therefore, our necessary conditions distinguish between the
following two cases for each ak 2 A and t 2 T:
UA
t   V A
t
UB
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Now consider a binary variable R(k;t) 2 f0; 1g. Let R(k;t) = 0 correspond to scenario
(NB-vi-d) and R(k;t) = 1 to scenario (NB-vi-e). Then, we can show that the constraints
(NB-vi-a) are met only if there exist R(k;t) 2 f0; 1g such that, for C  maxf(UA
t   V A
t ),
(UB












t )  R(k;t)C; (NB-vi-d1)
ak
A
t   (1   ak)
B









t ) > (R(k;t)   1)C; (NB-vi-e1)
ak
A
t   (1   ak)
B
t > (R(k;t)   1)C; (NB-vi-e2)
If R(k;t) = 0, then (NB-vi-d1)-(NB-vi-e2) comply with scenario (NB-vi-d). Else, if
R(k;t) = 1, then (NB-vi-d1)-(NB-vi-e2) comply with scenario (NB-vi-e). See the proof
of Proposition 2 for a detailed argument.
The following proposition captures these necessary conditions for (NB-vi) to hold.
10By rescaling the Afriat inequalities (NB-i)-(NB-iv) it is always possible to nd a suitable value for C.




t gt2T and A = fa1;:::;akg 2
]0;1[K. The data set S is Nash bargaining rationalizable only if, for every s 2 T, there
exist numbers UA
s , UB
s , V A
s ;V B
s 2 R+ and A
s , B















such that, for all t 2 Tnfsg, there exist numbers UA
t , UB
t , V A
t ;V B





t 2 R++ that satisfy (NB-i)-(NB-v) and, in addition, for all k  K there exist binary









t )  R(k;t)C; (NB{vi-d1)
ak
A
t   (1   ak)
B









t ) > (R(k;t)   1)C; (NB{vi-e1)
ak
A
t   (1   ak)
B
t > (R(k;t)   1)C; (NB{vi-e2)
The constraints (NB{vi-d1)-(NB{vi-e2) have been explained before. The additional
constraints (NB{vi-f1) and (NB{vi-f2) imply a normalization that is required for the nec-
essary conditions to have bite (i.e. to be rejectable); see the proof of Proposition 2 for a
more detailed discussion. As we require the test to be independent of the identity of s, we
verify this set of inequalities for each possible s 2 T. In the end, our necessary conditions
imply constraints that are linear in unknowns, with some binary integer variables (i.e.
the variables R(k;t)). These conditions are easily tested by mixed integer programming
solvers. In general, the ner the grid that denes the set A (i.e. the larger K), the more
stringent this necessary test will be.
4 Experimental analysis
We conducted an experiment to illustrate the practical usefulness of the testable im-





t gt2T. We will rst provide details on our experimental design.
Subsequently, we will present our main empirical ndings.
4.1 Experimental design
We conducted our experiment at the University of Leuven (a Belgian University). Par-
ticipants of our experiment were rst year business economics students (116 in total, 39
females). The experiment consisted of three sessions, which each contained around 40
participants. In each session, participants were divided over two computer rooms with 20
PCs each. Every participant was seated in front of a computer. Decision problems were
presented on the computer. Before the actual experiment, each participant had to ll in
a short questionnaire. The most important question was to choose between three kinds of
13beverage items (a soda, a light version of the same soda and orange juice) and three kinds
of food items (potato chips, chocolate and grapes). All items were shown in front of the
class room. We asked the participants to pick their preferred beverage and food items.
This should avoid that, during the experiment, participants had to choose between one or
more items they actually did not like: participants had to make allocation decisions that
involved (only) the selected beverage and food items (i.e. jNj = 2).
The actual experiment began after lling out the questionnaire. It consisted of two
parts. In a rst part, each participant had to make 9 (= jTj) individual consumption
decisions, which dened the threat point bundles xA
t and xB
t .11 Each decision situation
involved a number of tokens (dening the individual incomes Y A
t or Y B
t ) and prices (pt)
for the food and beverage items they had selected before. Prices were expressed per 10
centiliters for the beverage item and per 10 grams for the food item. Participants could
select their consumption quantities by using a scroll-bar, which implies a high degree of
accuracy. They had to spend the full budget, i.e. savings were not allowed. Table 1 presents
the prices (pt) and individual income levels (Y A
t and Y B
t ) for the 9 decision situations.12
We note that the price-income situations in our experiment imply a high discriminatory
power of our rationality tests (i.e. a high probability of detecting irrational behavior),
because there is little variation in income but a lot of variation in prices.13 Below, we will
provide empirical measures for the power of our tests. Table 2 provides summary statistics
on the budget shares of the food and beverage items for the individual decisions that we
observed.
For the second part of the experiment, participants were matched randomly 2 by 2. For
our sample, this obtained 7 female-female, 26 male-male and 25 male-female dyads. Each
dyad again had to make 9 (in casu joint) consumption decisions. Each such joint decision
corresponded to an individual decision in the rst part of the experiment. Specically, if the
individual decision was associated with incomes Y A
t and Y B
t and prices pt; then the dyad
decision was characterized by a joint income Yt = Y A
t +Y B
t +10 and the same prices pt; see
again Table 1. (We gave the dyads 10 extra tokens to provide them with an incentive to
eectively nd an agreement.) In every joint decision, participants had to account for the
consumption quantities xA
t and xB
t that were chosen in the associated individual decision
situations: these individual choices could no longer be changed and gured as threat (or
disagreement) points for the joint decisions. In the case of a dyad decision, the subjects
were asked to agree on a division of the joint income Yt over bundles qA
t and qB
t . In
addition, for each consumption decision both participants had the possibility to default on
the agreement (by clicking a radio button). This resulted in 48 dyads that always found
an agreement. Below, we will only report results for these 48 dyads (and 96 individual
players). Table 2 provides summary statistics on the dyads' choices.
11In particular, this assumes that the disagreement utility functions V A and V B coincide with the
utility functions under individual decision making. We believe this to be a plausible assumption for our
experimental setting.
12The order of the decision problems was randomized over the participants.
13For example, Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2003) apply a similar idea in their `maximum power
sequential path' procedure for maximizing the power of their revealed preference tests.
14Table 1: The 9 price regimes and corresponding (individual and joint) income levels
Observation price good 1 price good 2 Y A
t Y B
t Yt
1 3 5 12 22 44
2 4 4 14 24 48
3 5 3 13 23 46
4 3 5 18 18 46
5 4 4 17 17 44
6 5 3 19 19 48
7 3 5 24 14 48
8 4 4 23 13 46
9 5 3 22 12 44
Table 2: Summary statistics for the budget share spent on the beverage
mean var min 1st quartile median 3rd quartile max
individual decisions 0.483 0.052 0 0.35 0.5 0.62 1
collective decisions 0.475 0.039 0 0.4 0.5 0.58 1
To enhance the external validity of our experiment, we told the participants beforehand
that they would actually receive one of the consumption bundles they selected. The knowl-
edge that each choice ostensibly had the same chance of being implemented was supposed
to give economic signicance to otherwise merely hypothetical decisions, thus providing
participants with an incentive for making choices that truly represented their preferences.
More specically, at the beginning of the second part of the experiment we explained that,
if we picked a decision exercise from this second set of (joint) decisions, we would rst check
whether each player preferred it to the default option. If this was eectively the case, then
participants received the bargaining outcome qA
t and qB
t . In the other case, if at least one
player preferred the disagreement option, then we gave the threat point bundles xA
t and
xB
t . The goods were handed over in a separate room immediately after the experiment,
and they were given in packages that induced immediate consumption.
4.2 Results
We present results for the testable conditions in Theorem 1 (individual rationality), The-
orem 2 (collective rationality) and Propositions 1 and 2 (Nash bargaining rationality). A
specic focus will be on comparing the empirical performance of the Nash bargaining model
with that of the collective model. In this comparison, we will consider goodness-of-t (cap-
tured by pass rates) as well as discriminatory power (measured as rejection probability for
the given data) of the corresponding conditions. Indeed, we believe a fair comparison of
dierent behavioral models must complement a goodness-of-t analysis with a power anal-
15ysis: favorable goodness-of-t results, indicating few violations of the testable conditions,
have little meaning if the behavioral implications have low power, i.e. the conditions could
hardly be violated for the data at hand.
Specically, our following analysis will quantify the adequacy of dierent models by
adopting a recent proposal of Beatty and Crawford (2010). These authors propose a pre-
dictive success measure to evaluate the overall empirical performance of specic behavioral
models in the context of revealed preference analysis. As we will explain, this measure
simultaneously accounts for goodness-of-t and discriminatory power.
One further remark is in order. The tests dened above are `sharp' tests: they only
tell us whether behavior is exactly optimizing in terms of the behavioral model that is
under evaluation. Clearly, this is a demanding premise. In fact, one may argue that exact
optimization is not a very interesting hypothesis, but that we rather want to know whether
the behavioral model under study provides a reasonable way to describe observed behavior.
Therefore, in our empirical analysis we will also consider extended versions of the basic
(sharp) tests that account for optimization error; these extended tests focus on nearly
optimizing behavior rather than exactly optimizing behavior. See also Varian (1990) for
a general discussion on the usefulness of considering such nearly optimizing behavior in
empirical revealed preference analysis.
To deal with optimization error, we adapt an original proposal of Afriat (1973) (for
revealed preference tests in a unitary setting). In particular, we capture optimization error
by a so-called Afriat index e 2 [0;1]. For a given value of e, the extended tests then
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(The other rationalizability constraints have a straightforwardly similar construction.)
Clearly, if the Afriat index e = 1, then the extended tests coincide with the original sharp
tests. Lower values for e account for optimization error, which generally implies weaker
conditions to be tested. Considering e < 1 allows us to analyze the impact of optimization
error on our goodness-of-t, power and predictive success results.
Pass rates. Figure 1 presents the pass rates for the dierent tests under consideration:
Individual Rationality (IR in what follows), Collective Rationality (CR) and Nash Bargain-
ing Rationality (NBR). For each test, pass rates are measured as the fraction of participants
or dyads that meet the associated rationalizability conditions. The gure shows pass rates
as a function of the Afriat index e. We note that the gure contains 2 curves for Nash
bargaining rationality: the lower curve corresponds to the sucient conditions in Proposi-
tion 1 and the upper curve to the necessary conditions in Proposition 2. Table 3 provides
exact pass rates for selected values of e.
Let us rst consider individual rationality. The IR curve in Figure 1 pertains to the 96
individuals (in 48 dyads) that found an agreement for all decisions (see the discussion of our
16experimental design). For each individual, we verify if the associated data set fpt;xM
t gt2T
(M = A or B) satises the conditions in Theorem 1. Generally, we nd that individual
rationality is well supported: pass rates are close to 1 even for high values of e. We conclude
that individual rationality seems to be a reasonable assumption.
Next, the CR curve pertains to the 48 dyads that reached agreement. For each dyad,
we checked if the data set fpt;qA
t ;qB
t gt2T meets the conditions in Theorem 2. As explained
above, this veries whether Pareto eciency is a tenable assumption for the joint decisions
that we observe. The CR curve displays a similar pattern as the IR curve: pass rates are
high, also when e gets close to 1. Similar to before, we can argue that collective rationality
(or Pareto eciency) appears to be a plausible assumption.
These ndings for individual and collective rationality make it interesting to consider
Nash bargaining rationality. In this case, our rationality tests apply the conditions in




t gt2T. As for the associated NBR
curve in Figure 1, we observe three remarkable facts. Firstly, the pass rates for the necessary
and sucient conditions are generally close to each other. This suggests that the empirical
implications of the two conditions almost coincide. Also, when we decrease e, the pass rates
for the two tests increase at a similar pace. In our opinion, this suggests that combining
the two sets of conditions does form a useful basis for empirical analysis. This seems all
the more true when taking into account that we considered a fairly basic grid search (with
K = 9; see Section 3); a ner grid search can only bring the necessary and sucient
conditions closer to each other.
Secondly, we nd that pass rates are quite low if we consider the `sharp' Nash bargaining
rationality test: for an Afriat index e = 1, we get a pass rate between (only) 0.25 (sucient
conditions) and 0.27 (necessary conditions). However, pass rates increase very rapidly if
we allow for some optimization error. For example, for e = 0:90 we obtain that no less
than 92% of all dyads in our sample pass the Nash bargaining conditions (both necessary
and sucient). This suggests that the Nash bargaining model eectively does provide an
adequate description of observed dyad behavior as soon as we account for nearly optimizing
behavior instead of exactly optimizing behavior.
Our nal observation is directly related to the second one. Specically, if we exclude
optimization error, then pass rates for the Nash bargaining test are substantially below
those for the collective rationality test: for e = 1, the dierence in pass rates is no less
than 50%. However, and in line with our previous observation, this dierence decreases
rapidly with the Afriat index e. For example, if we consider e = 0:90, the dierence is no
more than 4%. Thus, when allowing for small optimization error, the goodness-of-t of
the Nash bargaining model (almost) coincides with the one of the collective model.
At this point, it is important to remark that lower pass rates for the Nash bargaining
test can be expected a priori. Indeed, because the Nash bargaining solution imposes consid-
erable structure on top of Pareto eciency (see Section 3), pass rates for Nash bargaining
rationality will always be situated below the pass rates for collective rationality. As such,
the lower pass rates for the Nash bargaining model may also signal more discriminatory
power rather than a worse model per se. This directly motivates our following exercises,
which consider power of the dierent tests in addition to the mere pass rates.


























Table 3: Pass rates for dierent values of optimization error
Afriat Index (e)
1 0.95 0.9 0.85 0.8
Nash Bargaining Rationality
Lower bound 0.25 0.75 0.92 0.96 0.98
Upper bound 0.27 0.75 0.92 0.96 0.98
Collective Rationality 0.77 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.98
Individual Rationality 0.78 0.91 0.96 0.99 1
18Power and predictive succes. As argued before, pass rates are only one part of the
story. Generally, favorable goodness-of-t results (i.e. high pass rates) for a specic be-
havioral model provide convincing support for the model only if the associated test has
high discriminatory power, i.e. a high probability of detecting behavior that is inconsistent
with the model (which we will call irrational behavior).14 Therefore, Beatty and Crawford
(2010) proposed a predictive success measure that combines the pass rate and power of a
test into a single metric. It is dened as follows:15
predictive success = power - (1 - pass rate).
Because pass rates and power values lie between 0 and 1, the value of this predictive
success measure is always situated between  1 and 1. A value close to 1 indicates a model
with approximately 100% power and 100% t, i.e. the best possible scenario. This means
that (almost) all data pass the rationality test, even though the test eectively detects
(almost) any deviating (i.e. irrational) behavior. By contrast, a value close to -1 implies a
model with approximately 0% power and 0% t, i.e. the worst possible scenario. In this
case, the test eectively allows for (almost) any observed behavior and yet the data fail to
pass. Finally, a value of 0 corresponds to a model with a rejection rate for the observed
behavior (= 1 - pass rate) that exactly equals the expected rejection rate if behavior were
irrational (= power). Essentially, this means that the rationality test does not allow for
distinguishing observed behavior from irrational behavior.
To compute the predictive success rate of a particular behavioral model, we rst need to
measure the power of the model. As mentioned above, power stands for the probability of
detecting irrational behavior (i.e. behavior that is inconsistent with the model). Following
Bronars (1987), we model irrational behavior by randomly drawing a quantity bundle for
each price regime. In particular, in our application we conducted Monte Carlo simulations
with 1000 iterations, which obtained 1000 random data sets of 9 observations. Our power
measure then equals the probability that our tests reject rational behavior for this simulated
random/irrational behavior.
Before presenting the predictive success rates of the dierent models, we have a quick
look at the power results. For the four models under evaluation, Figure 2 sets out power as
a function of the Afriat index e; Table 4 gives power estimates for a selection of values for
e. Not surprisingly, we nd that power decreases with e for all models under evaluation.
Next, and more importantly, we observe a substantial dierence between the NBR and
CR curves.16 In general, the discriminatory power of the Nash bargaining test is much
14See Beatty and Crawford (2010), Bronars (1987) and Andreoni and Harbaugh (2008) for a detailed
discussion of this point.
15We note that this predictive success measure actually assigns an equal weight to discriminatory power
and goodness-of-t. This equal weighting may seem arbitrary to some. Interestingly, however, Beatty
and Crawford (2010) show that this weighting scheme has an interesting axiomatic characterization. We
believe this provides a convincing theoretical foundation for our focus on the equally weighted predictive
success measure.
16In fact, the same applies when comparing the NBR and IR curves, but this dierence is less relevant
here.
19above the one of the collective rationality test, and the dierence remains more or less
constant for dierent values of e. In addition, we nd that the Nash bargaining test has no
less than 100% power for e close to 1. In fact, power remains very high (i.e. close to 100%)























Let us then consider the predictive success rates of the dierent models. Figure 3
displays predictive success rates as a function of the Afriat index e, and Table 5 gives
predictive success rates for specic values of e. These results bring together our earlier
goodness-of-t and power results. Firstly, if we look at the IR and CR curves, we nd
that predictive success generally increases with e. The best performing model specication
corresponds to e = 0:99 (collective rationality) or 1 (individual rationality). In both cases,
predictive success is about 0.60. Because this is far above 0, we conclude that both models
can be categorized as `good' models for the application at hand.
Next, it is interesting to compare the CR curve with the NBR curve. Here we nd
that the Nash bargaining model with a little optimization error largely outperforms the
collective model. For example, for e = 0:90 the predictive success of the Nash bargaining
model amounts to no less than 0.90. This is very close to the maximum of 1, which indicates
this specication of the Nash bargaining model as a `very good' one for the setting under
study.
At a more general level, we believe that these results provide a convincing empirical
argument pro the Nash bargaining model. The model imposes considerable structure on
joint decision processes, which gives it substantial discriminatory power. Interestingly,
20Table 4: Power for dierent values of optimization error
Afriat Index (e)
1 0.95 0.9 0.85 0.8
Nash Bargaining Rationality
Lower bound 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.77 0.45
Upper bound 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.88 0.55
Collective Rationality 0.84 0.66 0.44 0.23 0.10
Individual Rationality 0.81 0.61 0.41 0.24 0.12
even though it implies much prior structure, the model does provide a good empirical t
of the observed consumption behavior (if we account for a small amount of optimization
error). In our opinion, these two attractive features together, which imply a high degree of
predictive success, strongly suggest the model as a most valuable alternative for describing
consumption decisions involving multiple players.
Table 5: Predictive success for dierent values of optimization error
Afriat Index (e)
1 0.95 0.9 0.85 0.8
Nash Bargaining Rationality
Lower bound 0.25 0.75 0.88 0.73 0.43
Upper bound 0.27 0.75 0.90 0.84 0.53
Collective Rationality 0.61 0.62 0.39 0.19 0.08
Individual Rationality 0.59 0.52 0.36 0.23 0.12


































5 What if threat point bundles are not observed?
Our above application demonstrates the usefulness of the revealed preference approach
for analyzing experimental data in terms of the Nash bargaining model. A natural next
question is whether this approach can also be useful for analyzing observational (i.e. non-
experimental) data. After all, consumption models are often applied for analyzing house-
hold behavior on the basis of observational data.
In this respect, an important concern is that observational data often do not contain
information on threat point bundles (xA
t and xB
t in Theorem 3). For example, as thoroughly
discussed by Chiappori (1988), McElroy and Horney (1990), McElroy (1990) and Chiappori
(1990), exact information on threat points is usually lacking in household consumption
applications. In this section, we consider the extension of our previous characterization
towards (e.g. household) settings with unobserved threat point bundles.
Preliminary discussion. As a starting observation, we note that the testable impli-
cations of the Nash bargaining model coincide with the ones of the collective model if
threat point bundles are not observed (i.e. we have a data set S = fpt;qA
t ;qB
t gt2T) and
we make no further assumption. Specically, this case does not impose any restrictions on
the consumption bundles at the threat points (i.e. xA
t and xB
t for all t 2 T). As such, we
can also freely choose the values of V A
t and V B
t . Given this, it is easily veried that the
corresponding testable implications of Theorem 3 are equivalent to the ones of Theorem 2.
22As a result, the Nash bargaining model is empirically indistinguishable from the collective
consumption model.17
Given this, our following analysis will make particular assumptions about the threat
points. Specically, we will show that the Nash bargaining model obtains specic restric-
tions if we assume either that the same threat points apply to dierent decision situations
or that the individual incomes (rather than individual consumption bundles) at the dis-
agreement points are known. As we will show, in each case the Nash bargaining model has
stronger testable implications than the collective consumption model.
Our focus on these two specic assumptions is motivated by our belief that they may
be particularly relevant for analyzing observational data on household consumption. For
example, in such a setting it may eectively be a reasonable hypothesis that threat points
remain constant over a given period of time. Next, knowledge of the divorce legislation
can help to simulate the income distribution in case of disagreement. We will return to
possible applications on household data in the concluding Section 6.
Constant threat points. Consider a data set S = fpt;qA
t ;qB
t gt2T, i.e. the threat
point bundles xA
t and xB
t (t 2 T) are not observed. Under the assumption of constant




such that V A(xA




t ) = V
B
for all t 2 T. As a specic instance, this applies if xA
t = xA and xB
t = xB
for some bundles xA and xB, i.e. the threat point consumption bundles are the same for
each observation.
In this case, we get the next condition for Nash bargaining rationalizability.
Denition 4. Let S = fpt;qA
t ;qB
t gt2T. We say that S is Nash bargaining rationalizable
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t solve OP-TP for the utility functions V A and V B, prices pt and incomes
Y A
t = ptxA





t solve OP-NB for the utility functions UA and UB, prices pt, income
Yt = pt(qA
t + qB
t ) and threat points V A(xA
t ) and V B(xB
t ).
We now obtain the following characterization of Nash bargaining rationality under
constant threat points.
Proposition 3. Consider a data set S = fpt;qA
t ;qB
t gt2T. The following conditions are
equivalent:
(i) S is Nash bargaining rationalizable under constant threat points.
17See also Chiappori, Donni, and Komunjer (2011) for a similar conclusion.
23(ii) For all t 2 T, there exist numbers UA
t , UB
t 2 R+ and A
t , B
t 2 R++ such that, for all
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Two observations apply to this result. Firstly, this proposition includes the conditions
for Pareto eciency (or collective rationality); see (NBx-i) and (NBx-ii). But it imposes
the additional constraint (NBx-iv). This constraint makes that the Nash bargaining model
is empirically distinguishable from the collective rationality model under constant threat





t ). This nonlinearity parallels the one of constraint (NB-vi) in Theorem 3. As
such, it can be solved in a similar manner (using analogues of Propositions 1 and 2).
Known individual incomes under disagreement. Let us then consider the case in
which we know the individual income levels Y A
t and Y B
t under disagreement (but not the
bundles xA
t and xB





Then, we can obtain testable implications by considering indirect indirect utility functions
W A and W B that apply under disagreement (instead of the direct utility functions V A and
V B). Formally, for any prices p and incomes Y A and Y B, we have the following relations

























In what follows, we will use that the functions W A and W B are convex.
We now get the following condition of Nash bargaining rationality.




t gt2T. We say that S is Nash bargaining ra-
tionalizable for known individual incomes under disagreement if there exist direct utility
functions UA and UB and, in addition, indirect utility functions W A and W B that corre-
spond to direct utility functions V A and V B such that, for all t 2 T, we have that




+ that solve OP-TP for given V A and V B, prices pt and
incomes Y A
t = ptxA





t solve OP-NB given the functions UA and UB, prices pt, income Yt =
pt(qA
t + qB
t ) and threat points V A(xA
t ) and V B(xB
t ).
We can establish the next characterization.




t gt2T. The following condi-
tions are equivalent:
(i) S is Nash bargaining rationalizable for known individual incomes under disagreement.
(ii) For all t 2 T, there exist numbers UA
t , UB
t , W A
t ;W B
t 2 R+, A
t , B
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t   W B
t
: (dual-vi)
It is useful to compare this proposition with Theorem 3. The main dierence is that the
inequalities (dual-iii) and (dual-iv) replace the original inequalities (NB-iii) and (NB-iv) in
our earlier theorem. These new inequalities are so-called dual Afriat inequalities. Similar
to the Afriat inequalities that we considered before, these dual inequalities allow us to
provide an explicit construction of the indirect utility levels (W A
t and W B
t ) associated with
each observation t. The vectors zA
t and zB
t are then collinear with the consumption bundles
at the threat points. See Brown and Shannon (2000) for a more detailed discussion of these
dual Afriat inequalities.
The same two observations apply as to Proposition 3. In particular, an analogous
argument as before obtains that the Nash bargaining model again imposes stronger empir-
ical restrictions than the collective consumption model. Next, the constraint (dual-vi) is
nonlinear in the unknowns (UA
t , UB
t , W A
t ; W B
t , A
t and B
t ), but this nonlinearity can be
resolved similarly as before (for constraint (NB-vi) in Theorem 3).
One nal remark is in order. Because the characterization in Proposition 4 implies a
weaker data requirement than the characterization in Theorem 3, it has a wider appli-
cability. However, the counterpart is that its empirical implications generally have less
discriminatory powerful. Therefore, if the threat point bundles are eectively observed, we
recommend focusing on the characterization in Theorem 3 rather than the one in Propo-
sition 4.
6 Concluding discussion
We have studied the testable implications of the Nash bargaining model for a two-player
game involving consumption decisions on bundles of goods. The distinguishing feature of
our study is that we followed a revealed preference approach. We have argued that this
25approach is particularly useful for verifying the empirical validity of the Nash bargaining
model. Specically, we have derived a revealed preference characterization of the Nash
bargaining model both when threat point bundles are observed and when threat point
bundles are not observed. We have shown that this can be used for practical tests of
consistency of observed behavior with the Nash bargaining model. We also demonstrated
the usefulness of these tests by means of an application to experimental data. This provided
a rst empirical test of the validity of the Nash bargaining model as a tool for describing
consumption decisions. In addition, it showed that a specially tailored experiment can
obtain a very powerful analysis of the Nash bargaining model as a tool for describing
consumption decisions.
Our analysis also allows us to draw some further theoretical and empirical conclusions.
From a theoretical point of view, our results shed light on the dierent testable implications
of the Nash bargaining model and the collective consumption model. In this respect, a
rst observation is that the Nash bargaining model has stronger empirical implications
than the collective model if we can observe the threat point bundles. These additional
implications reect the fact that the Nash bargaining model imposes more prior structure
on the consumption decisions than the collective model, which only maintains Pareto
eciency as an assumption. More interestingly, however, we have also demonstrated that
the Nash bargaining model can have stronger implications even if the threat point bundles
are not observed. Specically, we have shown that this is the case as soon as threat points
are assumed to be constant over dierent decision situations or if individual incomes at
the disagreement point are known by the empirical analyst. As discussed in Section 5, we
believe that these last ndings may have practical usefulness for analyzing observational
data (e.g. on household consumption) in terms of the Nash bargaining model.
At an empirical level, our application to experimental data has shown that the Nash
bargaining model may eectively provide a good description of multi-player consumption
decisions. In particular, we obtained that the testable implications of the model have much
discriminatory power (e.g. when compared to collective consumption model). Importantly,
even though it has considerable power, the model also provides a very good empirical t of
the observed consumption decisions in our experiment. In our opinion, these two attractive
features together strongly suggest the Nash bargaining model as a most valuable alternative
for empirically analyzing joint consumption decisions.
We see dierent avenues for follow-up research. Firstly, given the favorable results for
the Nash bargaining model in our experimental setting, we believe a natural next step con-
sists of bringing the testable implications developed in this paper to household consumption
data. Indeed, multi-player consumption models are often applied for the empirical analysis
of household behavior. As indicated above, such an analysis can start from our revealed
preference characterization that does not require observed threat point bundles. In this re-
spect, one important remark pertains to the fact that all our testable conditions need that
individual consumption bundles in bargaining outcomes are observed. This is often prob-
lematic in a household context: household data sets usually only contain information on the
aggregate household consumption and not on the individual consumption. Interestingly,
however, data sets with individual consumption information are increasingly available in
26the literature. See, for example, Browning and Gortz (2006), Bonke and Browning (2009),
and Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2010). For such data sets our testable conditions
are directly applicable, which may thus obtain a powerful revealed preference analysis of
household consumption behavior.
Next, follow-up research can also focus on other bargaining solutions that are fre-
quently considered in the literature, such as the generalized Nash bargaining solution, the
Raia-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, the egalitarian solution and the equal sacrice solu-
tion. Essentially, these models dier from each other in terms of the axioms they impose
on the bargaining solution. In fact, by adopting a similar reasoning as in this paper, it is
possible to derive the revealed preference characterizations of these alternative bargaining
models. One can then use these characterizations to compare the empirical performance
of the dierent models (and the underlying axioms). For example, such a comparison may
carry out an experimental analysis similar to ours.
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Appendix A: proofs
Proof of Theorem 3
We will use the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let UA;UB;  UA;  UB 2 R. Then for any V A;V B 2 R, for which V A <
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 UA   V A
UA   V A +
 UB   V B
UB   V B:
Next, (3) implies
 UA   V A
UA   V A >
UB   V B
 UB   V B; (1)
so that we obtain
2 >
UB   V B
 UB   V B +
 UB   V B
UB   V B
, 2 >
(UB   V B)2 + ( UB   V B)2
( UB   V B)(UB   V B)
, 0 >
 
( UB   V B)   (UB   V B)
2
( UB   V B)(UB   V B)
:
By assumption the right hand side in this last inequality is positive, which yields the
wanted contradiction. This proves the lemma.
We can now prove Theorem 3.
Proof. Necessity. Take any t 2 T. The rst order conditions of the optimization programs





































t ) is a suitable
subdierential for the function UC (V C) at the bundle qC
t (xC
t ), with C = A;B. The




t )   U
A(q
A











t )   U
B(q
B











t )   V
A(x
A











t )   V
B(x
B
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This shows that the remaining constraints (NB-i)-(NB-iv) are also satised.

















































Varian (1982) showed that the utility functions V A and V B make sure that, for all t 2 T,
xA
t and xB






t = V A(xA
t ) and V B
t = V B(xB
t ).
It only remains to show that qA
t and qB
t are a solution for OP-NB for the utility
functions UA, V B, V A and V B. Take any t 2 T and consider any qA;qB 2 R+ such
that pt(qA + qB)  pt(qA
t + qB
t ). Observe that we need qA;qB with U(qA) > V A
t and
U(qB) > V B









































32The constraint (NB-v) guarantees that UA
t > V A
t and UB
t > V B
t . Given this, the



















Proof of Proposition 1
The result follows directly from our argument in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 2




t ), then (NB{vi-d1) implies R(k;t) = 1 and,
because of (NB{vi-e2), 0 < akA
t   (1   ak)B
t . As such, we obtain
UA
t   V A
t
UB














A similar reasoning implies
UA
t   V A
t
UB














Given this, the constraint (NB-vi) in Theorem 3 can only hold if the constraints
(NB{vi-d1)-(NB{vi-e2) are met for any k  K: if the constraints were violated for some k,
then we can never obtain (NB-vi-a) (or, equivalently, (NB-vi)). However, the constraints
(NB{vi-d1)-(NB{vi-e2) have no bite (i.e. are not rejectable) by themselves: without addi-
tional conditions, it is always possible to rescale the Afriat numbers UA
t , UB





t such that (2) (or, similarly, (3)) is met for any value of ak.
To obtain necessary conditions that are rejectable, it suces to normalize these Afriat
numbers for some observation s. This is guaranteed by the constraints (NB{vi-f1) and
(NB{vi-f2). One can easily verify that such a normalization does not interfere with feasi-
bility of the constraints (NB-i)-(NB-v). In fact, if the set S satises the characterization
in Theorem 3, then feasibility of the constraints (NB{vi-d1)-(NB{vi-e2) and (NB{vi-f1)
and (NB{vi-f2) (in addition to (NB-i)-(NB-v)) must be independent of the identity of s.
Therefore, we have to check the same constraints for each possible s 2 T.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can use V A
t = V B
t = V and xA
t = xB
t = x for all




t = V A
v , any A
t > 0 automatically solves (NB-iii) in Theorem 3, i.e. we can drop
the corresponding constraints as redundant in Proposition 3. Of course, the same applies
to individual B and condition (NB-iv). Finally, observe that the empirical implications
33of conditions (NB-i) and (NB-ii) remain unaected if we add a common term to all UA
t
or UB
t . Hence, redening UA
t and UB
t by subtracting the common term V for all t 2 T
eectively gives conditions (NBx-i) - (NBx-iv).
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Theorem 1 of Brown and Shannon (2000) shows that (dual-iii) and (dual-iv) provide
a revealed preference characterization of the indirect utility functions W A
t and W B
t for the
given set S: Using this, the proof of the result is directly similar to the one of Theorem
3.
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